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Abstract
This article discusses whether a globally competitive high-tech firm is sustainable without being associated with a 
sufficiently dense sectoral innovation system. It focuses on Embraer and hence on the Brazilian aeronautics industry. 
Despite not benefiting from a highly subsidized process for technological and financial modernization, Embraer has 
become the world’s third-ranking producer of commercial jets thanks to institutional innovations, especially in producing 
and managing contracts with suppliers and risk-sharing partners. The conclusion drawn is that the competitiveness of 
the Brazilian aircraft industry depends on the continuing supply of technology in international markets. Technological 
restrictions imposed for geopolitical reasons, or even for market constraints, could fatally undermine the strategy 
adopted by the company.
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Introduction
Brazil’s industrial matrix is sophisticated from the 
productive standpoint, but it emphasizes production more 
than value creation and appropriation. Production chains 
are strongly asymmetric with value chains, hence the 
scant value added. Sectoral innovation systems are mostly 
incomplete, lacking the points of greatest creativity, which 
are precisely those that add most value. Thus, national 
industrial policy has not yet left behind a manufacturing 
vision to adopt a value creation and appropriation one. 
Most of policymakers continue to focus on the idea that 
what matters is the “shop floor”, regardless of how much 
value is added in production. 
As a reflection of this structure, sectoral production and 
innovation systems are still deficient with regard to value 
creation and appropriation. Among few exceptions, as in 
the case of the aeronautics industry, Brazil has strongly 
increased its share of the world market, with Embraer 
achieving third place in 2007 behind the giants Boeing and 
EADS, but ahead of Bombardier, its closest competitor. 
In this sense, Embraer is a unique phenomenon in Brazil: 
aircraft manufacturing is the only high-tech industry of all 
the globally competitive sectors in Brazil today.
A closer analysis of the sectoral innovation system (SIS) 
in Brazil’s aeronautics industry, however, highlights a 
combination not seen anywhere else, between a strong 
company, Embraer, and a relatively weak production chain 
(small suppliers), partnering with a group of research 
institutions whose importance to the system varies 
greatly (Dagnino, 1993; Bernardes, 2000; Marques & 
Oliveira, 2009). 
In this sense Embraer can be considered an exception 
in the global aeronautics industry and in the recent 
trajectory of the Brazilian manufacturing sector. Three 
main competencies explain Embraer’s recent success: 
outstanding capabilities in engineering design; excellence 
in assembly and systems integration; and contractual 
innovation, buying the required technology wherever it 
can be found.
The main purpose of this work is to present and discuss the 
formation of the Brazilian aircraft industry in light of the 
SIS concept, seeking conceptual and empirical elements 
that can help explain the company’s recent success and 
predict possible future trajectories. In other words, in 
addition to describing and qualifying the Brazilian AISIS it 
also sets out to discuss the sustainability of the industry’s 
recent trajectory, analyzing in particular the extent to 
which a complex sectoral system such as the aeronautics 
industry can maintain global competitiveness while buying 
mission-critical technology in the marketplace, without 
major internal R&D efforts, and making relatively little 
use of typical government support, such as public-sector 
procurement, military orders, R&D subsidies etc.
Thus the article addresses two key issues, one theoretical 
and the other factual. The theoretical issue relates to 
understanding and analyzing the sustainability of SIS in 
their territorial specificities. 
The article has four sections besides this introduction. 
The next section presents and discusses the theoretical 
framework used to define sectoral production and 
innovation systems, pinpointing the most useful 
conceptual elements for an analysis of the characteristics 
and prospects of the Brazilian AISIS. The following section 
analyzes the main characteristics of the global aeronautics 
industry, emphasizing the Brazilian AISIS, its history, 
development, current makeup, value chain, investment in 
R&D, and technological leadership by Embraer. Lastly, the 
article presents conclusions indicating that technological 
density needs to be developed for long-term sustainability 
and that productive density should be a consequence of 
strategic decisions to expand the local knowledge base, 
local R&D, and local innovation.
Sectoral Innovation Systems
Subjects or Participants
The innovation systems approach is particularly appropriate 
to explain the innovation process as a collective game in 
which various different and complementary components 
must interact so that new products and services can be 
created. In the case of the aeronautics industry, the idea 
of a dynamic combination of different actors to produce 
innovations is highly relevant, given the industry’s productive, 
scientific, technological and organizational complexity. 
Sectoral innovation systems (SIS) in the aeronautics 
industry can also be characterized as complex adaptive 
systems, in accordance with Hobday (1998), who notes 
that in some cases a project is begun without even 
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prior knowledge of all the technology required to solve 
the problems involved, and this technology has to be 
developed during the course of the project. 
Innovation systems can be understood as the structure 
and dynamics that enable the innovations of a given 
country, region or industry to be understood. With regard 
to coverage, innovation systems are usually classified 
as national, regional, local or sectoral (OECD, 1997). 
Particularization of the concept for the sectoral level 
was thoroughly developed by Malerba and collaborators 
(Malerba, 2002; 2004; Malerba & Mani, 2009).
The sectoral innovation system model synthesizes and 
defines the core elements of innovation, their behavior, 
limits and interactions. It promotes a better understanding 
of the specific learning and innovation processes in 
any given sector. Thus it is a simultaneously simple and 
effective approach that facilitates the comprehension of 
complex aspects of innovation dynamics by enabling their 
components to be distinguished and analyzed in terms of 
their interrelationships, so that development policies can 
be formulated and implemented. Moreover, the model 
is appropriate for computer simulations to facilitate 
the comprehension of inputs, outputs and outcomes 
(Malerba, 2004).
Malerba (2002) detailed the concept of sectoral 
systems by breaking it down into seven basic elements: 
products; agents; knowledge and learning processes; 
basic technologies, inputs, demand, linkages and 
complementarities; interaction mechanisms between 
firms and non-firms; variation and selection processes; 
and institutions. 
In analyzing the ways in which these elements of 
the system interrelate, Malerba (2002) argues that 
sectoral co-evolution is a process of interaction among 
technology, industrial structure and institution, basing 
this view on Nelson (1994) and Metcalfe (1998). He adds 
that it involves links between demand, knowledge base, 
learning processes and organization (firms and non-firms). 
By focusing on knowledge base and learning processes 
instead of industrial structure we can better understand 
the dynamics of knowledge, competencies and sectoral 
competitiveness with regard to market structure. 
In the case of the global aeronautics industry, although it 
typically has a creative accumulation regime (largely owing 
to strongly path-dependent technology accumulation), 
aircraft manufacturers’ ability to command the sectoral 
system of production and innovation is a matter of mutual 
dependency rather than hierarchy. Of course, giant firms 
such as Boeing and EADS have significant power of 
induction over technology and innovation in the sectoral 
system, but even they have to deal with other giant 
firms that supply aircraft parts and aeronautical systems. 
Thus there is a kind of balance between integrators and 
suppliers, determined by the greater or lesser power of 
induction wielded by the firms involved and by a close 
relationship between users and producers of technology 
(Lundvall, 1992; Bernardes, 2000).
The systems approach is useful when studying innovation 
organization and dynamics in countries, regions and 
sectors, precisely because it shows the composition and 
above all the interrelations between components (both 
the components and their interrelations are variable). 
Nelson (1990) shows that the most successful innovation 
systems are the best interrelated and coordinated, not 
necessarily the most complete. This is especially valid for 
sectoral innovation systems (see Malerba, 2002). 
On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that certain 
types of industrial organization display similarities in 
their various innovation systems. Even in these systems, 
however, there may be organizational and institutional 
innovations (in contract management, for example) that 
change the structure in place so as to compensate for 
its deficiencies and fill any gaps in technical and scientific 
competencies using innovative managerial solutions. This 
is the point discussed below: production and technology 
densities may be more or less necessary to enhance a 
sector’s global competitiveness, but what seems to 
be most important is the ability to build relationships, 
alongside the existence of flows of product and process 
technology offerings, which are decisive for success in a 
complex high-tech industry (Hobday et al., 2005). 
The next section discusses the characteristics of 
aeronautics industry innovation systems on a global scale, 
particularly in terms of constitution and competition, 
with special emphasis on the Brazilian case.
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The Aeronautics Industry Sectoral System
This section presents a brief overview of the global 
aeronautics industry, followed by a more detailed outline 
of the profile and evolution of the Brazilian industry, 
highlighting its constitution, institutional composition, 
investment and characteristics according to the concepts 
relating to sectoral innovation systems discussed above.
The global aeronautics industry
The global aeronautics industry is highly concentrated 
at present. Formation of the Boeing and Lockheed-
Martin conglomerates in the U.S., EADS, BAer and 
ATR in the European Union, and Bombardier in Canada 
resulted from major mergers and acquisitions designed to 
strengthen this strategically important sector financially 
and technologically. Governments openly contributed to 
the merger and acquisition (M&A) process via funding in 
most cases. The companies involved were mostly set up by 
aviation pioneers, growing stronger during world war two 
and the cold war, especially thanks to the boom in defense 
procurements following the emergence of the military-
industrial complex in the U.S. These contracts drove 
the development of technology frequently embodied in 
civilian applications. 
According to OECD (1997) and Santos (2009), the overall 
characteristics and competitive dynamics of the aerospace 
industry make it one of the most important sectors in the 
productive structure of the advanced economies.
Thus the pattern of competition in this industry revolves 
around the continuous introduction of technological 
innovations and the conditions for financing innovation, 
which takes place continuously but gradually. Despite 
what has been said, the introduction of technological 
innovations even when incremental leads to the 
emergence of a new “dominant project” and a rupture 
of the prevalent technological paradigm. This new 
project soon becomes mandatory, and competing firms 
are obliged to adopt it or be forced out of the market. 
Cumulativeness and path dependence are strongly present 
in the sector (Dosi, 1988). As a result, the aerospace 
industry is characterized by a high level of technological 
dynamism, which contributes to permanent changes in its 
configuration (Ferreira, 2009).
The next subsection outlines the constitution of this 
system in Brazil, associating the historical elements of its 
formation with the sectoral system concepts discussed in 
the introductory section of this article.
The Brazilian Aeronautics Industry Sectoral 
Innovation System (AISIS)
The modern Brazilian aeronautics industry started 
with the Bandeirante plane which made its maiden 
flight on October 22, 1968. To produce it Embraer 
was incorporated on August 19, 1969, with the federal 
government owning 51% and the rest belonging to private 
investors. (Silva, 1998; Bertazzo, 2008).
In 1971, Embraer began making the Italian light attack 
jet and trainer Aermacchi MB 326, renamed Xavante, 
under license. In the late 1960s the agriculture ministry 
commissioned the Ipanema for agricultural use, mainly 
crop dusting. This aircraft made its maiden flight in 1970 
and went into production in 1972 (1,000 units have 
now been produced). The Tucano (BEM-312), a military 
turboprop for pilot training, first flew in 1981. This plane 
and its light attack version, the Super Tucano (EMB-314), 
are both best-sellers (Silva, 1998; Bernardes, 2000; Forjaz, 
2005; Bertazzo, 2008).
Embraer steadily acquired more competencies. After the 
Bandeirantes it launched the Xingu, a pressurized twin 
turboprop with the same wing and engine design but with 
a completely new fuselage. It then produced the Brasília 
(EMB-120), a high-performance twin turboprop commuter 
airliner for 30 passengers widely used by regional airlines 
in the U.S. and Europe, which acquired it in the 1980s and 
1990s (Bernardes, 2000; Forjaz, 2005; Silva, 1998).
In 1982 Embraer began a partnership with Italian firms 
to design and build the AMX ground attack aircraft, 
a “simplified” version of the Panavia Tornado. This 
enabled Embraer to achieve a technological leap forward 
(Bernardes, 2000; Forjaz, 2005; Silva, 1998).
In late 1980s Embraer was hit by a dire financial crisis 
that shook the world and had especially severe effects for 
Brazil (the foreign debt crisis of 1982). By the beginning 
of the 1990s government decided to privatize the firm 
but was determined to transfer majority ownership to 
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Brazilians. In 1992 Ozires Silva was invited to return as 
CEO and head the privatization process. Embraer was put 
up for auction in 1994 (Forjaz, 2005). The new controlling 
shareholders were pension funds with 40%, Bozzano, 
Simonsen with 20%, and a group of investors with a total 
of 20% comprising Dassault, EADS, Snecma and Thales 
Group. The Brazilian government, represented by the air 
force ministry, today a military command subordinated 
to the defense ministry, kept a golden share (Bernardes, 
2000; Forjaz, 2005; Silva, 1998).
An extensive corporate restructuring program was 
implemented following privatization. The next step was 
the launch of the ERJ-145 family of commercial jetliners 
for up to 50 passengers. This has been a success, selling 
1,000 aircraft by 2006. Fresh investment was then made 
to produce the Embraer 170/195 line of aircraft with 
between 70 and 120 seats, originally classified as E-Jets. 
These too have sold well. Embraer also markets Legacy 
and Phenom executive jets and is steadily growing its 
share of this market.
In 2006, to counterbalance the centrifugal force of 
other initiatives and strengthen its position not just in 
the industry but also in the entire Brazilian S&T sector, 
Embraer partnered with the City of São José dos Campos 
and the São Paulo State Government to create a local 
technology complex (TechPark of São José dos Campos) 
as a key part of the strategic development plan for the 
metropolitan area and as a component of the state 
system of technology complexes (Sao Paulo Systems 
of Technological Parks). The technological profile of 
the complex enables it to meet demand mainly from 
the business platforms established in the city and the 
surrounding areas, as well as facilitating the creation of 
new opportunities. It is also worth noting that Embraer 
is installing a light structure lab in the complex (Parque 
Tecnológico, 2009; Simões, 2009). 
The regulatory agencies set up as part of the privatization 
movement include ANAC (Agência Nacional de Aviação 
Civil), created in 2005 to regulate civil aviation and award 
airworthiness certification, which used to be DCTA’s 
responsibility. DCTA’s IFI now focuses on metrology and 
exclusively military certification (Anac, 2010). 
To make its increasingly complex aircraft feasible, Embraer 
currently coordinates a network of strategic partners. 
These partners are the foundation of Embraer’s value 
chain (as indeed in the case of all civilian aircraft makers 
today) and each of them in turn has its own network of 
suppliers (Quadros et al., 2009). As well as partners, 
Embraer also has direct suppliers from whom it sources 
lower value added goods and services. 
In the beginning, Embraer was forced to deal with a 
large number of suppliers and bear most of the costs 
of development itself. These are non-recurring costs, 
typically requiring the sale of some 400 aircraft to cover 
the investment (Lima et al., 2005). Thus, the aircraft maker 
needs considerable credibility to persuade suppliers to 
become risk-sharing partners. Nowadays, modularization 
prevails and system and subsystem integration tasks are 
distributed to their respective tiers so as to enable more 
effective partnering and risk sharing. This is the solution 
Embraer has been pursuing. Table 1 shows the evolution 
of number of risk-sharing partners in the three main 













EMB 120 Brasília Turboprop 1991 30 500 – 
ERJ 135/145 Turbofan 1997 37-50 350 4 
ERJ 170/190/195 Turbofan 2002 70-90-108 22 11 
 
Table 1. Evolution of Risk Partnerships in Embraer’s Projects / Sources: Quadros et al. 2009; Embraer 2008.
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The process of deverticalization with partnering 
undertaken by Embraer thus involves integrators of 
systems and subsystems. In other words, in any given 
project Embraer develops and coordinates a network of 
partners and suppliers who orbit around it; engages in 
and encourages others to engage in strategic outsourcing 
and the development of capabilities; and promotes the 
sharing of capabilities between partners. In this sense 
Embraer tends to transform its partners into centrally 
strategic firms like itself, with a network of collaborative 
relationships around each one and all these networks 
sharing competencies (Hitt et al., 2003). Table 2 shows 
the evolution of the risk-sharing model in three different 
phases and aircraft projects.
FAMILIES 
1980s 1990s 2000s 
500 suppliers 4 partners & 350 suppliers 16 partners & 22 suppliers 
EMB 120 Brasília RJ 135/145 EMB 170/195 
All manufacturing by 
Embraer 
Risk-sharing partnerships 
Installation of risk-sharing partners 
in Brazil 
Verticalization of production 
chain 
Subcontracting of processes Increase in process subcontracting 
Non-electronics design  
Design & electronics 
information 
Electronic mock-up & process 
simulation 
Line assembly  Line assembly  Dock assembly  
Old manufacturing 
management concepts: low 
productivity 
New production concepts with improved quality & productivity: 
5S, Lean, Kaizen, Cell, Robust Process 
Conventional production 
processes 
Start of automation in 
fabrication of parts  
Automation in fabrication & final 
assembly 
 Table 2. Evolution of Embraer’s Partnering Process/ Source: Embraer (2008)
In the ERJ 170/195 program, besides growing and 
deepening its partnerships Embraer also grew and 
diversified the participation of local suppliers, especially 
in engineering services and industrial processes. However, 
with few exceptions Embraer’s network of partnerships 
in production and innovation remained internationalized, 
and the company showed no propensity to bring these 
activities to Brazil (Quadros et al., 2009). Indeed, Embraer 
is a high-tech company that has invested very little in R&D 
compared with any competitor. The company typically 
presents itself to the market as a “creative follower” 
with strong design capabilities and excellent transactional 
competencies both in contracting with partners and 
in selling aircraft. Its option to build relationships with 
partners rather than suppliers contributes to the 
outsourcing of engineering and R&D. 
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Investment in R&D by the main actors is a central aspect 
of any innovation system. Thus the flow of investment 
determines the main technological trajectories and 
pipelines in the system (Park & Park, 2003). Embraer 
evidently got the make-or-buy decision right under the 
prevailing world and domestic economic, technological 
and contractual conditions. 
Thus the key strategic decision was to outsource the most 
specific and least available components of an aircraft, 
such as fuselage, wing, propulsion, avionics and interior 
systems, among others. Embraer’s central skill, which 
enables it to fill gaps from technology available elsewhere, 
is producing and managing contracts with its risk-taker 
suppliers. In fact, what is involved here is designing a 
foundation for the make-or-buy decision (Prahalad & 
Hamel, 1990; Hamel & Prahalad, 1995). Differently of the 
two archetypes of strategies discussed by Lee & Lieberman 
(2007), Embraer’s strategy fits in a sort of middle term 
between asset acquisition and internal development.
Embraer leveraged its core competencies as a specialized 
buyer. This involved various risks and costs, but also 
opportunities. For example, by developing partners as 
a way of reducing transaction costs (Williamson, 1985) 
Embraer also transferred to partners the responsibility 
for dealing with a great many suppliers. This in turn 
meant that its partners began producing ever-larger 
subsystems and physical sections (Quadros et al., 2009). 
As a result, Embraer became more dependent on these 
partners and vulnerable to opportunistic behavior. This 
risk first materialized in an episode involving the wing of 
the E190/195, Embraer’s flagship product family. The wing 
was originally outsourced to Kawasaki, which on winning a 
contract to supply the fuselage for the Boeing 787 and not 
feeling able to fulfill both contracts apparently preferred to 
break with the Brazilian company in order to concentrate 
on the contract with Boeing (Reuters, 2008). 
Buying from a supplier or developing and producing 
internally becomes a permanent decision matrix: a large 
part of the technology can be outsourced only when 
trust between the parties is strong and even so requires a 
minimum of internal technical competence. The important 
issues that cannot be overlooked in this case are the 
specificity of the product, process or services in question 
and the non-economic factors involved, i.e. factors 
relating to military strategy. These bring transaction costs 
and the role of local and national innovation systems back 
to the center of the analysis regarding the evolution of the 
Brazilian aeronautics industry.
To deal with Embraer’s investment in R&D and technological 
protagonism, Figure 1 compares investment in R&D 
by the Brazilian aeronautics industry with and without 
Embraer. That helps measure the density of the sectoral 
innovation system (Central Bank of Brazil, 2009; Ministry 
of Science and Technology, 2009; Embraer, 2010). By 
excluding Embraer, it can at once be seen that government 
investment in R&D directly or with the participation of 
other companies in the aeronautics chain is negligible. 
Embraer is responsible for almost all local R&D.
Figure 1 – Brazilian Aerospace R&D Investments.
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Profile Two-Aisle Long Range Jets Single-Aisle Regional Jets 
 Boeing EADS Bombardier Embraer 
Revenues 61 US bi 65 US bi 
(Airbus 25 US bi) 
18 US bi 7 US bi 
Employees 162.200 (Airbus 56.000) 66.000 23.500 
R&D 2 US bi 2 US bi 200 US mi 118 US mi 
Patents 
(USPTO) 
2829 154 568 5 
 
Table 3 -  Some Comparative Figures about Embraer Métier relative to 2007 and 2008/ Source: the authors, using data from: 
Quadros, 2009; Embraer, 2008; Industry Center, 2009
Embraer’s R&D investment went mainly into installation 
of the Light Structure Lab in the São José dos Campos 
TechPark. The laboratory started operating in late 2010. 
It is important to note that to date Embraer has not 
benefited from any output from this new R&D unit. 
Embraer’s patenting activity began only in 2006. Up to now 
it can display much smaller records that its competitors. 
In spite of the fact that it is widely understood that patent 
applications plus R&D investments are not the sole 
indicators of a company’s R&D performance. However, 
they are proxies that cannot be ignored in comparative 
analysis. While Embraer can be seen to have changed its 
R&D strategy in recent years, stepping up investment in 
this area and seeking to develop proprietary technology, 
it will be possible only in the medium to long term to 
say whether this strategy will be sustained and indeed 
expanded. For now it is merely a trend.
Embraer is thus an exception in such a technologically 
dynamic and economically globalized sector. Thus we 
have a paradox: a weak system with a strong company. 
The question that naturally arises is how a firm in a typical 
high-tech sector can be globally competitive without these 
structural conditions, which in principle would appear to 
be a sine qua non (Fundação Museu de Tecnologia de São 
Paulo, 2009; Bernardes, 2000, Forjaz, 2005; Silva, 1998; 
Goldstein, 2002, 2008; Goldstein & Godinho, 2010).
The Brazilian AISIS and the constituent 
elements of a sectoral innovation system
Returning to the elements that characterize a sectoral 
system, the Brazilian AISIS is analyzed below according to 
the seven points expounded by Malerba (2002). 
As noted above, the Brazilian AISIS depends heavily on 
specialized technology suppliers and contractual forms of 
development with these suppliers that are not trivial. In 
this sense, the system is strongly dependent on market 
relations, both upstream and downstream.
The elements that characterize and support the analysis 
of sectoral systems, according to Malerba (2002) are: 
products; agents – firms and non-firms; knowledge and 
learning processes; basic technologies, demand, links and 
complementarities (centripetal movement); interaction 
among firms and non-firms; variation and selection 
processes; and surrounding institutions.
The main product of the Brazilian AISIS is evidently the 
aircraft produced by a company that designs, makes and 
sells aircraft worldwide. This is the core element of the 
AISIS, without which it perhaps could not be said that 
Brazil has an aeronautics sectoral system at all. In other 
sectors, by contrast, especially consumer goods, local 
existence of the sectoral system would not be negated 
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by the absence of local production of the main product. 
Well-known cases include Nike and Apple, for example 
(Dedrick et al. 2009). There may come a time when 
aircraft production is entirely outsourced, but this is not 
foreseeable in the industry’s current global trajectory.
As for the presence of firms and non-firms, as noted 
above the AISIS has supplier firms in Brazil and abroad, 
with the latter predominating as far as the value chain 
is concerned. The local firms are small, and supply 
components and parts of low relative value. As for non-
firm agents, such as educational and research institutions, 
several are present in Brazil but the only ones that are 
genuinely an active and direct part of the AISIS are 
the institutions that train aeronautical engineers and 
other professionals, and the airworthiness certification 
institution. Research institutions exist but are not fully 
integrated and contribute very little to the AISIS.
The knowledge base and learning processes have three 
drivers: the training of engineers; Embraer’s design and 
integration competencies; and aeronautics certification 
competencies. This triangle is sufficient to constitute 
a system of high technological complexity. The fourth 
component found in the sectoral systems of all other 
countries with an aeronautics industry is R&D, practically 
non-existent in the Brazilian case.
Interaction mechanisms between firms and non-firms 
in the Brazilian AISIS have a history dating from the 
creation of ITA and CTA. Embraer was in many ways 
an offspring of these organizations, as was the entire 
Brazilian aeronautics industry. In contrast with the U.S., 
European and Canadian model, however, in the Brazilian 
case these mechanisms are limited to the training of 
human resources and airworthiness certification. Military 
and government orders are important to other systems 
but it was practically absent in the recent evolution of the 
Brazilian AISIS.
With regard to institutions in the sense defined by Malerba 
(2002), such as norms, routines, regulation etc., the 
Brazilian AISIS has few significant locally constructed links. 
This may be the aspect that shows this sectoral system as 
one of those with the strongest institutional references. 
Quality and safety certification is an element that serves 
as a reference for any aeronautics firm anywhere in 
the world. The Brazilian AISIS was wise to include this 
component as a key competency from the word go.
Thus innovative combinations of internal and external 
competencies are one of the reasons for the success of 
this sectoral innovation system. The critical point now 
is prospective, i.e. to what extent this combination is 
sustainable in the long term and how far it will be necessary 
to increase local density in production and technology to 
assure the system’s competitiveness.
International experience and known trajectories show that 
the path to increased density is inevitable. It is impossible 
to say how far density must be increased, but two facts 
already noted in this article suggest this direction is not 
just desirable but necessary: (1) the fact that the supply of 
technology in this sector is not regulated only by market 
factors and that extra-market factors, especially those of 
a strategic military nature, are permanent and influence 
access to critical technologies; (2) the fact that even in 
market conditions and with full access to technology, 
competition among firms tends to increase, leading 
once again to asymmetries in the supply of and access to 
critical technologies, now no longer for reasons of state 
but for market reasons. Thus the future of firms that do 
not produce or own knowledge and technology tends to 
be less sustainable than that of firms that do.
Thus what the Brazilian AISIS most lacks is more intense 
efforts to create and appropriate technology, not least 
in order to continue accessing and acquiring technology 
in the marketplace. Bargaining power would thereby 
be enhanced and fragility reduced in a context where 
not only competition will intensify (with China, Japan 
and Russia all entering the lists), but also geopolitical 
movement is extremely sensitive. From this perspective, 
the concept of sectoral innovation systems should be 
reinforced by that of local systems. A sectoral system 
is not decoupled from a territory however globalized it 
may be, as stressed by several authors (Saxenian, 1994; 
Malerba, 2003; Cassiolato & Lastres, 2005; Quadros et 
al., 2000; Montoro & Mignon, 2009; Marques & Oliveira, 
2009; Santos, 2009).
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Conclusion
Embraer’s success shows that it is possible to create a 
globally competitive high-tech company without significant 
in-house R&D and without substantially internalizing the 
value chain inside the company’s home country. This is 
due to its core competencies, particularly innovating in 
contractual relationships with major technology suppliers, 
and strong design engineering capabilities. To this must be 
added a third competency that is no less important: the 
capacity to sell aircraft. However, the fragility of this model 
resides in the fact that its long-term competitiveness 
depends on external factors, especially continuity of the 
supply of high-density technologies with a highly specific 
content. In other words, it depends strongly on factors 
that Embraer cannot control.
The durability of partnerships such as those entered into 
by Embraer depends on its ability to attract and retain 
partners, and this ability in turn varies according to the 
potential gains as well as the restrictions on global trade 
in critical or sensitive technologies. The economic crisis 
has triggered a return to nationalism and restrictions in 
markets for prime contractors, owing to tougher rules 
on access to critical technology. This affects not just 
suppliers but also (indeed far more) the market for civilian 
aircraft. Moreover, the geopolitical environment is key to 
the long-term sustainability of the value chain governance 
model adopted by Embraer. Changes in this environment 
are frequent and unpredictable. 
The absence of installed technological density and the 
main economic agents in the aeronautical value chain 
represents a far from negligible weakness for both Embraer 
and Brazil. Embraer will survive only if it constructs a new 
type of competency that enables it to participate directly 
in negotiations on next-generation aircraft and aeronautics 
technologies. This means going beyond aircraft design, 
assembly and marketing skills, as well as innovations in 
contracting out and governance, to create competencies 
in research and development, which in turn entails 
technological densification. Productive density is only an 
important condition when it comes with technological and 
knowledge density. In this perspective, and considering 
the specificities of the aeronautics sector, the extent on 
which the density of the local productive chain matters 
for the industry’s competitiveness should depend on a 
preliminary strategy of expanding local capabilities and 
the local supply of knowledge and technology.
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